Esther M. Zimmer Lederberg Memorial Website
Eugenics
Deutsch Ostafrika
The German objective in German East Africa was to create plantations,
and compel the native populations to grow coffee, cotton, millet, sisal,
and sugar. Ivory was collected as well as wild rubber. The method used
to create the slave laborers required was simple: hut taxes were required
that had to be paid in money, not barter. (At this time, barter was used
by the different tribes, whose economy was not based upon money.) Since
the natives had no money, the only way to get the money to pay the
tax would be to work on the plantations. The laborers were paid only enough
money (in fact, the natives said they were never paid at all) to compel the
natives to work. Thus this extortion was used to extract slave labour, for
the work was not entered into voluntarily. The key to the entire scheme
rested on military force.
"[Hermann von] Wissmann engaged in numerous punitive expeditions
in the south and around Kilimanjaro, and was appointed governor of
German East Africa in 1895, although he resigned in 1896, partly
because he could not control the Schutztruppe which had been placed
under the command of von Trotha, who outranked him. Upon his return
to Germany Wissmann ... was elected as president of the Berlin
Geographical Society in 1897." 1
"Following the example of Trotha in South-West Africa, the
Schutztruppe's advance was conducted with the utmost brutality;
they pursued a scorched-earth policy with disastrous consequences for
the indigenous population. But, in contrast to his colleague in
South-West Africa, the East African governor and commander, Count Adolf
von Götzen, did not order an explicit extermination strategy: it
was developed independently by the local troop leaders in the rebellious
areas. Caption von Wangenheim described his tactics in a letter to
Götzen in October 1905:
"'In my opinion only hunger and destitution can bring about their
[the rebels'] final subjugation.'
"He proposed to systematically destroy
indigenous settlements and fields. Götzen gave the local commanders
his full support and defended their actions with the argument that
they represented the only means of bringing the war to a succesful
conclusion. As a result, an extremely brutal and destructive form
of warfare was carried out until the end of the war in the spring
of 1907. As in South-West Africa, most of the casualties were civilian.
All the villages that the Schutztruppe passed through on their
campaign were destroyed, stores were looted and fields burnt. The only
military objective of these actions was to destroy the logistical and
supply infrastructure of the rebellion. The commanders showed little
interest in the effects this would have on the social and economic
situation of the colony. Official statistics put the number of victims
at 75,000; historians have estimated that indigenous losses were
considerably higher." 2
The use of machine guns, canons, naval cruisers, in conjunction with
starvation and exposure to the elements (when their houses were destroyed),
was used during the Wahehe Rebellion. Possibly Trotha, as commander of
the Schutztruppen in Deutsch Ostafrika BEFORE
he went to German South West Africa, learned the uses of these methods
in Deutsch OstAfrica. In any case, Adolf Graf (Count) von Götzen, Lothar
von Trotha, Tom von Prince, Karl Peters, Eduard von Liebert, Friedrich
Freiherr (Baron) von Schele and other Germans practiced genocide well before
genocide was used in German South West Africa: it was standard, accepted
practice by Germans.
The Abushiri rebellion took place on the African coast, opposite
Zanzibar. This area is often referred to as the "Swahili coast".
As Arab traders moved southward down the coast of Africa, they
engaged in trade. As these Arab traders were often away from
home for long periods of time, they engged in sexual unions with
non-Muslim African women, producing mixed-race children. These
children learned to speak an Arab/African pidgeon (trade language),
called Swahili.
.
Indeed this process mirrors exactly what happened as European
traders produced a mixed-race population as a by-product of
trading with the local population (Dutch Boers in Africa and
New World Surinam; "Metis" in French Indian Ocean Islands as
well as New World Novelle France; Quadroons, etc., with the
English in the New England, Portuguese in Brazil and Angola,
etc). 3
.
Before 1888, the DOAG [Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft,
or German East Africa Company] (and its immediate predecessor),
under managing director Dr. Karl Peters, had attempted to build
up the Company's African empire without really possessing the
financial means to do so. The Company was assisted by a number
of reserve officers of the German Army. On the Company's behalf,
they had led the so-called 'expeditions' into the interior of
East Africa to conclude 'treaties' with whoever was prepared to
put an appropriate mark on a piece of paper. These fraudulent
treaties were subsequently recognized by the Reich. Between 1884
and 1886 eighteen such 'expeditions' took place, resulting in the
establishment of ten stations. Many of the responsible officers
were later given commands in the Schutztruppe.
4
.
When German officer Emil von Zelewski attempted to force
acquiescence by the native Africans of these fruadulent "treaties".
Zelewski deployed 110 German marines from a German warship off the
coast, in an attempt to force a German administration upon the
African population. This led to 'the Arab revolt', causing a
conflict with the wealthy Islamic traders, led by Abushiri (a
mixed-race leader, with an Islamic father and a Galla mother).
.
Bismarck used the excuse that the coastal Moslems were engaged in
the slave trade. At this time, all the European powers in Africa
were engaged in the slave trade, even England that opposed only
the Atlantic slave trade, never the interior slave trade or the
Indian ocean slave trade.
.
In any case, opposition to the Swahili-coast slave trade was a
convenient excuse for Bismarck, and he could 'suppress the slave
trade and to protect German interests in East Africa.' A military
expedition was created by the Germans, headed by Hermann von
Wissman (later, the first German colonial commissioner) and
this expedition attacked Abushiri, employing the German Navy
along the coast, and also using artillery. Thus was the German
East African colony first started. 5
The Hehe indigenous people were led by Mkwawa. They were centered
circa 350 km inland from the Eastern African coast, near Zanzibar,
at a stone-walled boma (fortress) with a stone fence circa
4 m high. The perimeter of the boma was 5 km in circumference,
with fifty square bastions distributed at 100 m intervals. The
boma was located on the Iringa Plateau, at the Little Ruaha River.
.
Wissmann was replaced at this time Julius von Soden. The
military, headed by Emil von Zelewski, sought to attack the Hehe
with machine guns. As Zelewski was a racist who already had a low
opinion of Africans, he attacked the Hehe. Zelewski was killed and
his German force destroyed; von Soden appointed Captain
Tom von Prince to Zelewski's former position. Von Prince, more
cautious than Zelewski, built a chain of forts before resuming the
attack on the Hehe. At this point (1894) von Soden himself was
replaced by Colonel Freiherr von Schele; he too was directed
to attack the Hehe at Iringa:
.
"Schele poured shrapnel into the fortress while his
machine-guns, mounted in trees, commanded the open
spaces inside the boma." 6
.
The Hehe had previously captured two machine guns from the Germans,
but none of them knew how to operate them. Ton von Prince continued
the attack on the boma using machine-guns mounted on the stone
walls. Mkwawa, protected by his warriors, fled.
.
Colonel von Schele was vilified for his forward, adventurous pro-war
policy and resigned. He was replaced by General Eduard von
Liebert in 1896. Mkwawa was continually followed and attacked until
finally, his followers destroyed, Mkwawa committed suicide.
.
"The situation in in the interior of the colony was far worse.
Between 1891 and 1897 more than sixty campaigns were officially
fought against indigenous peoples, even though local commanders
reported only the more serious expeditions. (Local military
commanders often secretly conducted smaller campaigns, of which
even the governor was not subsequently fully informed.) The
Schutztrupe found it hard to combat the flexible guerrilla
strategy and staying power of the indigenous forces. They
compensated for this by resorting to a policy of vandalism which
had only one object -- the total destruction of the indigenous
population's means of life. Villages were burnt, cattle were
driven away and food reserves were plundered. Emil von Zelewski,
the commander of the East African Schutztruppe, and Tom
von Prince, the military commander of the Iringa district,
conducted their campaigns with particular brutality. The local
commanders eventually put down the rebellions in the interior by
adopting a strategy of systematic starvation, directed more
against the civilian population than the rebel forces. In
addition to starvation, the German military commanders were
helped by the continuous disunity and enmity between the
different rebel groups, which severely weakened their
effectiveness. At this point, the Schutztruppe could not
have dealt with a united enemy." 7
.
German consolidation followed. With German dominance, smallpox,
rinderpest and armed resistance followed. The Germans constructed a
railroad to exploit plantations, supplied by slave laborers. These
plantations were cafetals, cotton, millet, sisal, and of sugar. Ivory
was collected as well as wild rubber. A money hut tax was imposed
specifically, used as a form of extortion to force natives to enslave
themselves on the plantations. As a consequence of these ruinous
policies, a significant amount of the population was
destroyed. 8
.
The colony was off to a good start.
The Maji-Maji Rebellion (1905-1907) 9
"A settler named Steinhagen — Bwana Kinoo —
owned the cotton plantation at Samanga. This is how the
work was organised:
.
"During the cultivation there was much suffring. We, the
labour conscripts, stayed in the front line cultivating.
Then behind us was an overseer whose work it was to whip
us. Behind the overseer there was a jumbe [ruler], and
every jumbe stood behind his fifty men. Behind the line
of jumbes stood Bwana Kinoo himself. Then, behold death
there! And then as you till the land from beginning to
end your footprints must not be seen save those of the
jumbe. And that Selemani, the overseer, had a whip, and
he was extremely cruel. His work was to whip the conscripts
if they rose up or tried to rest, or if they left a trail
of their footprints behind them. Ah, brothers, God is
great — that we have lived like this is God's
Providence! And on the other side Bwana Kinoo had a
bamboo stick. If the men of a certain jumbe left their
footprints behind them, that jumbe would be boxed on the
ears and Kinoo would beat him with the banboo stick using
both hands, while at the same time Selemani lashed out at
us labourers." 10
.
"The rebellion began among the stateless peoples of the south-east
and extended to the newly created states of the Southern Highlands.
It took place at the moment of transition from the nineteenth-century
economy to the colonial order and it began as a movement of highlanders
and frontiersmen resisting incorporation into the colonial economy and
reduction to peasant status. To uproot cotton was therefore an apt
ultimatum. To the men of Nandete, in the Matumbi highlands north-west
of Kilwa, cotton symbolized the foreign penetration and control which
had followed defeat in the 'war of the pumpkins' seven years earlier."
11
.
"Behind all these particular grievances lay the face of an alien
rule:
.
"All these are words that buzz like bees. If you had experienced
it, you would have known how grave it was. To be chained, to be
shot with bullets in the grown of one's head and in one's chest,
while in addition you carried loads as the great eye of heaven
rose up! Alas, such was life, and those iron chains were many
— he made them in his own country. Better remove such
suffering; fight him off so that the loads are carried by the
askari themselves." 12, 13
.
"[The Matumbi] ... needed to ensure that every clan would join
the rebellion and to find an answer to German firepower."
14
.
"These questions were answered by a prophet named Kinjikitile
Ngwale. He lived at Ngarambe, below the western slopes of
Matumbi, and held no position of authority until mid 1904,
when Hongo possessed him. Hongo was a spirit subordinate to
Bokero, the chief diety ..." 15
.
"Kinjikitile built a huge spirit-hut where all could communicate
with their ancestors. He distributed a medicine - the maji
(Ki-swahili for water) of the rebellion's name - to
protect men against European bullets. He took local beliefs in
divinity, possession, and medicines and amalgated them into a new,
dynamic synthesis which promised the people unity, leadership,
and protection." 16, 17
.
"Kinjikitile taught that Africans were one and that his
medicine — the maji of the rising's name — was
stronger than European weapons. His teaching spread among
the people living around the River Rufiji. It reached
the Matumbi through a whispering campaign they called
Njwiywila:
.
"Njwiywila means secret communication such as at a secret
meeting. At that time if you listened to Njwiywila you
paid one pice. That was the meaning of Njwiywila. The
message in Njwiywila was like this: 'This year has been a
year of war, for there is a man at Ngarambe who has been
possessed — he has Lilungu. Why? Because we are
suffering like this and because ... we are oppressed by the
akidas. We work without payment. There is an expert at
Ngarambe to help us. How? There is Jumbe Hongo!'[African ruler]
This Njwiywila began at Kikobo amongst the Kichi, for they
were very near Kinjikitile. It spread to Mwengei and
Kipatimu and to Samanga. But the people of Samanga did
not believe quickly. It spread quickly throughout Matumbi
country and beyond. In the message of Njwiywila was also
the information that those who went to Ngarambe would
see their dead ancestors. Then people began going to
Ngarambe to see for themselves." 18
.
"Pilgrims visited Ngarambe openly in crowds, 'like a wedding procession', but their secret object was to obtain war medicine against the Germans. Kinjikitile took the title Bokero and employed assistants called hongo."19
.
"The movement had begun in answer to the religious message
of a prophet. The power of the maji — power over
European weapons — depended on religious faith. And
as the movement expanded away from the Rufiji Valley during
August and September, it was again carried by the prophets.
These men called themselves hongo, messengers. They carried
unity and invulnerability. They called on all black men to
rise against European rule. Theirs was a revolutionary,
or more accurately a milennial, message, a promise to rid
the world of the evils of witchcraft and European rule. It
is likely that the people ... had heard such milennial
teachings before, but only as attacks on witchcraft. Now this
religious tradition was mobilised against the Germans."
20
.
"When the headman of Nandete ordered men to carry his tax chest
to Kilwa, they decided, without consulting Kinjikitile, to
declare war by uprooting cotton." 21
.
"Wearing the dark kaniki cloth favoured by Bokero and with
millet-stalks strung around their foreheads ... [and] uprooted
cotton on a hated plantation..." 22
.
Governor Götzen ... sent nearly 200 askari and police into Matumbi..."
and the Germans were ambushed by rebels animated by an unusual
morale. 23
.
The rebels said that " 'This is not war' ... 'we shall not die.
We shall only kill. ... Each clan head who accepted maji
was known as a hongo and distributed medicine
to his men, although there were specialist hongo ...
whose job it was to rid the warriors of their fear of dying' ."
24, 25
.
"'Truly we were firmly united', one [of the warriors] remembered.
'There was no tribalism in obeying the leaders.' "
26
.
"August 1905 was the month of victories. By its end, German
forces existed only on the coast and in the four powerful
military stations at Mahenge, Kilosa, Iringa, and Songea.
If they were to win, the Maji Maji fighters had to capture
these stations. On 30 August, the Mbunga and Pogoro peoples
tried to take Mahenge. A missionary described this greatest
single action of the rising." 27
.
"A fortnight earlier he [Götzen] had realized that the
rebellion was more than a [local] Matumbi affray. He had
telegraphed for 150 European troops ... to command 600 extra
askari. European troops were refused. ... [T]he Kaiser ordered
two cruisers and their marine complements from China and the
Pacific [Kaiser Wilhelmsland] to dar es Salaam."
28
.
The decisive battle of the Wahehe Rebellion took place at Mahenge:
.
"Two machine-guns, Europeans, and soldiers rained death and
destruction among ranks of the advancing enemy. Although he
saw the ranks thin, the survivors maintained order for about
a quarter of an hour, marching closer amidst a hail of bullets.
But then the ranks broke apart and took cover behind the
numerous small rocks. Now and again a group rushed out on
the road, lifted one of the fallen, and quickly fled again
behind the rocks. Scurrying from rock to rock they made their
retreat. Then suddenly the cry rang out: 'New enemy on the
Gambira [eastern] side!' Everyone looked in that direction,
and there ... a second column of at least 1,200 men was
advancing towards us. Fire was opened upon them immediately.
The enemy sought to reach Mahenge village at the double.
There they were hidden by the houses and stormed up the
road towards the boma. As soon as they reappeared within
range they were met by deafening fire. The first attackers
were only three paces from the firing line when they sank
to the ground, struck by deadly bullets. Those behind them
lost courage, turned, and scattered ... When no more
enemy could be seen, the Station Commander climbed down
from the top of the boma tower ... and distributed champagne."
29
.
Due to the great morale based upon belief in the power of maji,
other tribes continued to oppose the Germans. The Sagara Uhehe area
around the river Ruaha then united in opposition to the Germans.
"... the hongo marching in front [of their forces]
waving their whisks with which they administered maji,
while their followers swayed their heads as they walked to
the rattle the millet stems which ringed their foreheads."
30
.
It was explained that maji failed if warriors had
"... broken the taboo against sexual intercourse."
31, 32
.
"The most important of Kinjikitile's teachings was multi-tribal
unity, which differentiated the rebellion from ...[earlier]
uprisings." 33
.
Maji Maji was German East Africa's first collective political
experience. 34
.
Under Götzen in 1905, "Submission was compelled by patrol
warfare in which military engagements were secondary to seizure
of food and destruction of crops." ... "Götzen had already
decided to create a famine throughout the rebel area."
35
.
"German forces had no military answer to guerilla warfare.
Instead, they used famine. One commander had recommended this
as early as October 1905:
.
"In my view only hunger and want can bring about a final
submission. Military actions alone will remain more or less
a drop in the ocean. The people will be compelled to abandon
their resistance completely only when the food supplies now
available have been consumed, their houses, have been
destroyed by constant raids, and they have been deprived of
the opportunity to cultivate new fields."
.
"Some officers saw famine as a final solution to the threat
of revolt. Captain Richter in Songea believed this:
.
"When Fr. Johannes drew the District Officer's attention to
the possibly imminent famine, he replied: 'That's right,
the fellows can just starve. We shall be sure to get food for
ourselves. If I could, I would even prevent them from planting
anything. This is the only way that we can make the fellows
sick of war.'" 36
.
"Total deaths in Maji Maji and its aftermath are unknown. Dr.
Gwassa estimates them at 250,000-300,000, or perhaps one-third
of the area's total population,..." 37
Consolidation of Deutsch Ostafrika, Maji-Maji Rebellion through 1918
The German public found it difficult to accept defeat after
World War I. Finding success stories (as well as scapegoats)
became a propaganda objective. Although Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck
didn't exactly prove victorious in Deutsch Ost Afrika, he also
wasn't defeated, thus von Lettow-Vorbeck became a hero to the
German public. However, exactly what did Germany under Paul
von Lettow-Vorbeck accomplish?
.
It is said that Vorbeck perfected a form of guerilla warfare.
However, guerilla wars are always associated with nationalism.
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was never associated with any
form of "nationalism" in Deutsch Ost Afrika. The only form of
warfare that von Lettow-Vorbeck was associated with was "bush
warfare".
.
Zimmermann in Deutsch Kamerun and Heyedebreck in Deutsch Togo
both fought a prolonged defense of their colonies, while
minimizing damage on these German colonies in terms of the
loss or destruction of property and life. Lettow, on the
other hand, maximized casualties. Von Lettow-Vorbeck used
scorched-earth tactics to create chaos in Deutsch Ost Afrika,
and to secure food and forced labourers, thus it was the
natives who bore the brunt of the suffering of the war in
Deutsch Ost Afrika. Von Lettow-Vorbeck was successful in
diverting troops and material from being used against Germany
in Europe, but at the expense of destroying Deutsch Ost Afrika.
.
It has been claimed that Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck retained the
loyalty of his followers (mercenary troops of askaris and Ruga-ruga)
and his 45,000 porters. However, these mercenaries knew that the
native populations would kill them at the first opportunity, and
these loyal porters were shot if they deserted (but even then,
the porters deserted at a rate of 15% per month: 90% in 6 months)!
If this is loyalty, exactly what does disloyalty look like?
.
Vorbeck did abandon coastlines for the most part, and fought inland
to avoid engagements with Allied troops transported via the allied
Navy to the coast. However, Vorbeck actually had no other alternative.
Vorbeck did fight one successful battle against Indian troops under
the British at Tanga ("Battle of the Bees"). These Indian troops were
exhausted, ill-trained, and their British officers were over-confident
as they expected to "make short of a lot of niggers". Instead, Lieutenant
Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck made short work of the British. However,
once the British started to take the colony of Deutsch Ost Afrika
seriously, Vorbeck was essentially on the run for 20 months, gaining the
name ‘Lettow-Fallback’. Vorbeck was not fighting a guerilla war, he was
in constant tactical retreat.
Conclusion 38, 39, 40, 41
Lieutenant colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, Götzen, Tom von Prince,
Lothar von Trotha, etc., continued the process of destroying the native
population and ecology, essentially temporarily 'winning' a desert for
Germany, which it soon lost (along with all its other colonies).
1
Jan-Bart Gewald, "Colonial Warfare: Hehe and World War One,
the wars besides Maji Maji in south-western Tanzania",
ASC Working Paper 63, 2005
.
2
Kirsten Zirkel, Chapter 5. "Military power in German
colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their
leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918",
in David Killingray and David Omisi, Eds., "Guardians
of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers,
c. 1700-1964", Manchester University Press, 1999,
pp. 102-103.
.
3
J.T. Last, "Notes on the Languages Spoken in Madagascar,"
in Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great
Britain and Ireland, London, Vol. XXV, 1896, p. 50
.
4
Kirsten Zirkel, Chapter 5. "Military power in German
colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their
leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918",
in David Killingray and David Omisi, Eds., "Guardians
of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers,
c. 1700-1964", Manchester University Press, 1999,
p. 94
.
5
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 91-96
.
6
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 112
.
7
Kirsten Zirkel, Chapter 5. "Military power in German
colonial policy: the Schutztruppen and their
leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918",
in David Killingray and David Omisi, Eds., "Guardians
of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers, in
East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918", 1999, p. 97.
.
8
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 165-166
.
9
Different names are used for the Maji-Maji war:
The Maji-maji rebellion was also known as the pahonga.
The Maji-maji rebellion was also known as the homa-homa (stabbing).
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 180
.
10
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One",
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 5.
.
11
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 168
.
12
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One",
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 8.
.
13
The Germans used two different types of black mercenaries:
Askari were foreign black mercenaries, from outside the area:
other African colonies or other German colonies not in Africa.
Ruga-ruga were locally-recruited black mercenaries.
Because these people were used against local Africans, it was
certain that if the Germans were defeated, or left, these
mercenaries would be killed by the local populace.
.
14
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 169
.
15
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 169
.
16
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 170
.
17
Maji was also referred to as Maji ya uzima or "the maji of
immortality". See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe, (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association
of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 19.
.
18
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One",
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 9-10.
.
19
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 170
.
20
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One",
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 17.
.
21
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 171
.
22
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 171
.
23
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 171
.
24
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 174
.
25
Hongo varied in meaning:
The spirit possessing Kinjikitile.
The title of Kinjikitile's assistants.
Any specialist that brought maji and distributed it.
Anyone who distributed maji.
Any warrior who took maji
Efficacy, not spirit.
.
26
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 174
.
27
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One",
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 20.
.
28
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 175
.
29
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 178-179
.
30
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 184
.
31
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 186
.
32
Taboos included:
No white magic or witchcraft.
No charms or medicines to be kept in houses;
all must be destroyed by fire.
No meat to be eaten unless slaughtered by cutting
the throat (hallal) If anyone wants meat they must
go into the bush and catch rats, and cut their
throats; else the meat is unlawful.
It is against the law to drink strong drink or beer
of 'kimela' because these drinks have the color of blood.
It is strictly forbidden to perform a marriage ceremony
until the war is finished.
When a man meets one of his friends, his greeting must
be 'Pyuu pyuu' and the friend must answer with the same words.
They must call Europeans not 'Europeans' but 'Waruteumbuchere'
because their stomachs must be speared.
Every man who is anointed must pay 3 pence to Hongo.
Every man is to sew one pesa (coin) into the folds of
his loincloth, for this will sharpen his intelligence.
Every man must wear on his head a turban made from the
leaves of a castor oil plant tied up with a string,
and two stalks of metama, because thus the Europeans
will not be able to see him.
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.), "Records of
the Maji Maji Rising: Part One", Historical Association
of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 18.
.
33
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 179
.
34
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 191
.
35
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 193
.
36
See G. C. K. Gwassa and John Iliffe (Eds.),
"Records of the Maji Maji Rising: Part One",
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4, 1967, p. 27.
.
37
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, p. 200
refers to Gilbert C. K. Gwassa, "Outbreak and development
of the Maji Maji War 1905-1907", p. 389
.
38
John Iliffe, "A Modern History of Tanganyika",
African Studies Series 25, Cambridge U. P., 1979, pp. 241-246
.
39
Hew. Strachan, "The First World War In Africa",
Oxford University Press, 2004
.
40
Edward Paice, "Tip & Run", Phoenix, 2007
.
41
Michael von Herff, "They walk through the Fire
like the blondest German: African Soldiers Serving
the Kaiser In German East Africa (1888 – 1914)",
M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1991
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